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	I agree with Liao et al. (2012) that anthropogenic global climate change (AGCC) is an urgent problem, and I am inclined to agree with them that we should take seriously the possibility of human engineering (HE) as a response. But we are not in perfect agreement. While I think the concept of HE needs much more careful analysis before we come to any general conclusions about it, my main worry is this: Liao et al. do not sufficiently appreciate how difficult it would be to use HE, even on a relaxed understanding of it, in a manner that is simultaneously (i) voluntary, (ii) just, and (iii) efficacious in dealing with AGCC.
	Begin with the very idea of HE. Though the authors tell us that it is, or at least involves, “biomedical modifications” (2012, 4), HE is a concept which cries out for a careful analysis. Let me offer an example of the sort of thing I have in mind and explain why it matters. A good conceptual analysis would distinguish among at least three kinds of HE: Permanent, Stable, and Unstable. Permanent HE changes irrevocably those who are its subjects.  One example of Permanent HE which Liao et al. discuss is making future humans smaller, through manipulation at the genetic level or, more plausibly, through control of a hormone such as somatropin. In contrast to Permanent HE, Stable and Unstable HE can be reversed. The main difference between Stable HE and Unstable HE is that instances of Stable HE will persist unless we do something to change them, but instances of Unstable HE will not. A prosthetic limb is a fair example of Stable HE, while a drug such a modafinal, which temporarily enhances memory, is a serviceable example of Unstable HE. 
	Why should we care about this distinction when it comes to AGCC? First, different kinds of HE raise different kinds of ethical questions. For instance, the benefits and burdens of Unstable HE could be shared without devoting enough social resources to make sure everyone has these benefits and burdens all of the time. But this is untrue of Permanent HE and probably of Stable HE as well. Second, Permanent HE is more ethically problematic than either Stable or Unstable HE.  Permanent HE is, after all, permanent. Those who receive its benefits and/or burdens cannot opt-out later, while those who receive the benefits and burdens of Stable or Unstable HE can. If we are to take seriously the idea of HE, as the authors argue, we must keep these points in mind. I will return to this point in a moment.​[1]​





	How might we use HE as a response to a collective action problem like the one just described?  Consider an example which the authors themselves suggest: the pharmacological enhancement of altruism. One way to implement such a strategy would be  to increase our levels of a peptide like oxytocine, which can be given easily, e.g., as a nasal spray. Indeed, Patricia Churchland reports a number of cases in which increased levels of oxytocine appear to promote trust and empathy (2011: 71-81). Plausibly, a greater degree of trust and empathy would make cooperation more likely in an n-person prisoners dilemma. So far, so good.





Buchanan, Allen 2011. Better than Human. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Churchland, Patricia 2011. Briantrust. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Liao, Matthew, Sandberg, Anders and Roache, Rebecca 2012. “Human Engineering and Climate Change,” Ethics, Policy, & Environment. 
Molander, Per 1992 “The Prevalence of Free Riding,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 36.




^1	 	For further moves along these lines see, especially, Buchanan (2011: 75-101).
